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Two theoretical ideas have emerged recently with the ambition to provide a unify-
ing functional explanation of neural population coding and dynamics: predictive
coding and Bayesian inference. Here, we describe the two theories and their com-
bination into a single framework: Bayesian predictive coding. We clarify how
the two theories can be distinguished, despite sharing core computational con-
cepts and addressing an overlapping set of empirical phenomena. We argue that
predictive coding is an algorithmic / representational motif that can serve several
different computational goals of which Bayesian inference is but one. Conversely,
while Bayesian inference can utilize predictive coding, it can also be realized by a
variety of other representations. We critically evaluate the experimental evidence
supporting Bayesian predictive coding and discuss how to test it more directly.
Highlights
– Predictive coding occurs in many different computations not just Bayesian inference
– Bayesian inference can be, but does not need to be implemented by predictive coding
– Data suggesting Bayesian inference is achieved by predictive coding is inconclusive
– Making predictions does not necessarily imply predictive coding
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Introduction
From very early work in neuroscience, it has been noted that neural systems rarely
represent measured quantities directly, as a human engineer might [1]. For instance,
a digital camera simply records and transmits the light intensity at each pixel [2]. In
contrast, the human retina preprocesses the signal using the surrounding pixels [3],
and the recent past [4]. Activity in the visual cortex is also strongly modulated by the
spatial and temporal context of stimuli [5] – to the extent that, for example, neurons
in primary visual cortex (V1) even respond to illusory contours, stimulus features that
are not physically present in the input but must be inferred from context [6]. Over-
all, there is much evidence that perception and, correspondingly, neural responses in
sensory cortical areas are as influenced by predictions and expectations about stimuli
as by the actual stimuli themselves [7, 8]. Indeed, while ascending feed-forward con-
nections convey stimulus-related information [9], long-range horizontal and feed-back
connections within and between different cortical areas provide a natural anatomical
substrate for conveying such “contextual” effects. The principles for how these con-
textual signals are computed, integrated with sensory information and represented in
neural activities have been formalised in two different, though closely related theoreti-
cal frameworks: predictive coding and Bayesian inference.
Predictive coding
Predictive coding is based on the simple but powerful idea that instead of representing
the input directly, it is often preferable to represent the prediction error, the difference
(or sometimes the ratio [10]) between a sensory input and a prediction (Fig. 1A):
prediction error = input− prediction (1)
One reason for doing so is that, if the prediction is correct, no costly spikes need to be
transmitted, thus improving efficiency [1, 2]. The spatio-temporal receptive fields of
retinal ganglion cells offer a classical example of this; they use the past and the sur-
round to predict the current light intensity in the centre, and then transmit the prediction
error, the difference between the measured light intensity and the prediction [11, 12].
Bayesian inference
Uncertainty is a ubiquitous feature of neural processing: in many situations it is impos-
sible to know the external, latent causes for incoming sensory stimuli. For example,
when hearing leaves rustling in the night, it is vital to infer whether the latent cause
was a dangerous predator, or simply the wind. The optimal strategy for computing
such inferences is to follow the rules of probability, including Bayes’ rule [13]. There-
fore, Bayesian inference of the latent causes of sensory inputs is one of the brain’s
fundamental computational goals (in the sense of the first of Marr’s three levels [14]).
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Figure 1. Neural arithmetics corresponding to different representational schemes. A.
Predictive coding: the difference between the input and a prediction is computed, and
the resulting prediction error is represented in the response of neurons. B. Probability
coding: the response of each neuron represents the posterior probability associated
with a particular value (or range of values) of the latent variable(s). Thus, to compute
their firing rate, neurons need to multiply their inputs, representing the likelihood, and
the prediction, representing the prior. C. Log-probability coding: the response of each
neuron represents the logarithm of the posterior probability associated with a particular
value of the latent variable(s), thus it needs to sum its inputs, representing the log
likelihood, and the prediction, representing the log prior. D. Direct variable coding:
the response of each neuron represents the value of a different latent variable. The
resulting population codes typically interpolate between what would be dictated by
inputs or predictions alone.
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Formally, Bayesian inference uses the current input data to compute the posterior prob-
ability of each latent cause, P(latent|input), by multiplying the prior probability of
each potential setting for the latents, P(latent), with the likelihood, P(input|latent), the
probability of receiving the current sensory input under that setting of the latents:
P(latent|input) ∝ P(input|latent)× P(latent) (2)
There is considerable behavioural evidence that human and animal behaviour exploits
Bayes’ theorem (Eq. 2) to achieve near-optimal performance in a variety of situations,
from decision making [15], through cue combination [16], to motor control [17]. How-
ever, there is a much more limited understanding of how the dynamics of cortical (and
potentially subcortical) circuits might implement Bayesian inference [18, 19].
Bayesian predictive coding
Although predictive coding and Bayesian inference agree upon the importance of com-
bining external inputs with internal signals (predictions or priors), they are comple-
mentary in their focus and the type of data they naturally address. While predictive
coding specifies that prediction errors, rather than raw predictions or inputs should be
represented, it remains agnostic as to how predictions are computed in the first place
and how prediction errors should ultimately be used. In contrast, Bayesian inference
provides an optimal calculus for computing predictions, but does not specify the under-
lying neural representation. Experimentally, as the examples in the previous sections
illustrate, predictive coding describes neural responses, while Bayesian inference de-
scribes the end-result of computation: behaviour.
It thus seems natural to combine the strength of these two theoretical ideas, and use the
latent variables inferred by Bayes’ theorem (specifically, a setting of latent variables
that is representative of the posterior distribution in Eq. 2) to provide the predictions
about the (current or future) sensory input required by predictive coding, for example as
the expectation of the input based on our current inferences about the latent variables:
prediction =
∫
inputP(input|latent) d input (3)
Neurons can then subtract this prediction from the actual input to form a prediction
error, as suggested by Eq. 1. In turn, such a prediction error turns out to be a very
useful input to a neural circuit implementing Bayesian inference, as it helps to guide
network dynamics towards population activity patterns encoding values of the latent
variables that better represent the sensory input [20]. A recent application of Bayesian
predictive coding is the “free-energy principle” [21] which can be seen as a special
case, using a specific class of dynamical probabilistic generative models, and a specific
class of variational filtering inference algorithms.
The most prominent experimental support for such a combined Bayesian predictive
coding scheme comes from the relative suppression of responses in V1 by extra-classical
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receptive field stimuli [22]. First, as a bar is lengthened beyond a cell’s classical re-
ceptive field, its response falls [23, 20]. Second, the response to a grating presented
in the classical receptive field depends on the presence of oriented structure in the sur-
round: having the same orientation in the centre and surround suppresses the response
[24, 20]. In both these cases, the centre and the surround form a coherent structure,
which allows the inferred latent variables to better model the presented image stimu-
lus, and so prediction errors at the lower levels become smaller – thus accounting for
suppressed V1 activity.
At the level of BOLD signals, V1 was activated less strongly by a coherent line draw-
ing, while higher order visual cortices (the lateral occipital complex, LOC) were more
activated by the coherent than the incoherent stimuli (Fig. 2A) [25]. Predictive coding
accounts for these effects by hypothesising that V1 represents the difference between
sensory input and a higher-level prediction, whereas the LOC represents the predictions
themselves. Thus, as above, when larger-scale structure is present, prediction errors are
lower, implying suppressed activity in V1, whereas the increased activity in LOC may
be a signature of the improved higher-level predictions [20, 25]. It is interesting to
note, however, that more direct electrophysiological measurements of visual cortical
responses, using stimuli with more carefully controlled statistics, found that activity in
V1 remains largely unaffected by manipulations of the level of naturalistic structure in
the stimulus [32], even as activity in V2 substantially increases for more naturalistic
stimuli [26].
Furthermore, in the temporal domain, in many brain areas including cortex and retina,
there are large, brief “transient” increases in activity following unexpected changes (in-
cluding stimulus onset, e.g. [28]; Fig. 2D). This has been most extensively studied in
primary auditory cortex, using a series of tones of which most have the same frequency,
with a few “oddballs” of a different frequency. Event related potentials measured using
electroencephalography display mismatch negativity (MMN), an elongation of the re-
sponse to these oddball stimuli (Fig. 2D) [33, 29]. Predictive coding accounts for these
effects by noting that, at stimulus onset, the unexpected stimulus cannot be predicted,
giving rise to a large prediction error. This prediction error is then rapidly eliminated
as new observations are incorporated into the predictions [29, 34].
Predictive coding: an algorithmic motif, not a computational goal
While it is natural to combine predictive coding with Bayesian inference, whereby the
prediction is based on an inferred latent variable and the resulting prediction error is
used to improve further predictions, this is not the only way to compute a prediction
and to make use of a prediction error signal. Indeed, using other types of prediction,
predictive coding can yield a useful representation that can serve a multitude of other
computational goals.
First, the retina is required to transmit the entire visual input through an extremely
narrow bottleneck: only around 106 cells [35] firing at only around 1 Hz [36]. As such,
the retina must maximize the information about the image present in the output signal
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Figure 2. A. Stimuli having progressively more high-level structure (top) give rise to
less BOLD activity in human V1 (bottom left), and more activity in higher-level visual
areas (lateral occipital complex, LOC, bottom right). Adapted from [25]. B. Stimuli
(right) matching low-level (frequency structure) and high-level structure in natural im-
ages [26, 27] evoke near-identical average responses in macaque V1 (top left; if any-
thing, the stimuli with higher-level structure gave slightly higher responses), despite
activity in V2 increasing substantially (bottom left). The horizontal black bar denotes
stimulus presentation, the grey bar is a noise control. Adapted from [27]. C. Stimulus-
induced transients in macaque V1 responses at the onset of a static visual stimulus pre-
sented between 0–400 ms. The magnitude of the transient scales with contrast (colour
code). Adapted from [28]. D. Mismatch negativity (MMN) in human auditory cortex.
Two types of auditory tones were presented, a standard stimulus at 1000 Hz that was
presented 80% of the time, and a deviant stimulus at a variety of frequencies that was
presented 20% of the time. The event-related potentials for the two stimuli (black:
standard 1000 Hz, red: deviant 1032 Hz) diverge around 200 ms after stimulus onset
(S, horizontal black bar). Adapted from [29] using data from [30]. E. Nonlinear signal
transformations result in changes in mean output even when only the variance of the
input changes. Bottom: two membrane potential distributions with identical means, but
one with less variability (red) than the other (blue). Top-left: firing rate nonlinearity
mapping from membrane potential (x-axis) to firing rate (y-axis). Right: the resulting
distributions over firing rates, and their means (horizontal lines). Notably, while the
mode of the broader (blue) distribution is smaller than the mode of the narrower (red)
distribution, the long tail of the broader distribution increases the mean above that of
the red distribution. F. Stimulus-induced transients in a sampling-based direct variable
coding model of V1 using non-equilibrium dynamics. The magnitude of the transient
scales with contrast (colour code). Adapted from [31], c.f. panel C.
6
by reducing redundancy [11]. In certain regimes (though see below), this objective
results in a predictive coding scheme, in which costly spikes are transmitted only when
predictions based on the surround or recent past are violated, meaning that static scenes,
or flat blocks of colour are encoded cheaply, thus reducing the high level of redundancy
that is inherent in the similar responses of nearby photoreceptor cells [12].
Second, a critical problem faced by sensory systems is that self-generated signals (e.g.
motion) can dramatically alter sensory input, swamping the more important externally
generated signals. To compensate for these self-generated signals, it is suggested that
an efference copy (i.e. a copy of motor commands) is sent to sensory areas, which
allows the effect of self-generated signals to be predicted, and subtracted from the
sensory signal, leaving only the externally generated signals [37]. These effects are
particularly evident in the observation that one cannot tickle oneself [38], in the shift of
visual receptive fields in anticipation of a saccade [22], and in the interaction between
self-generated electrical signals and electrosensation in the mormyrid electric fish [39].
Third, cortical circuits must typically encode continuous quantities in the external
world (such as trajectories of objects) using temporally punctate, all-or-none spikes. In
order to make this analogue-to-digital conversion efficient, it has been suggested that
the membrane potential dynamics of cortical neurons implement a predictive coding
scheme, such that membrane potentials represent prediction errors and spikes are gen-
erated only when prediction errors exceed a threshold [40, 41, 42]. For self-consistency,
the prediction error represented by membrane potentials is the difference between the
continuous signal that needs to be represented and its representation in the spiking ac-
tivity of the network itself. Such a predictive coding scheme results in biophysically
plausible leaky integrate-and-fire membrane potential dynamics and Poisson-like spik-
ing patterns often observed in cortex.
Fourth, animals need to learn to select actions that yield high long-term rewards (an
objective formalised by reinforcement learning [43]). One powerful solution to this
computationally challenging problem is to maintain predictions about expected re-
wards, and compute a reward prediction error, describing whether an action gave rise
to more or less reward than expected. Such a prediction error can be used to increase
the propensity to perform actions resulting in higher-than-expected rewards, and also
to update future predictions [44, 45, 46]. Neurally, there is strong evidence that this
reward prediction error is instantiated by dopamine [47], which has indeed been shown
to be a potent modulator of synaptic plasticity [48].
In summary, predictive coding emerges and performs a useful function not only in
the service of Bayesian inference, but also when achieving a wide variety of different
computational goals: maximizing information transmission, cancelling the effects of
self-generated actions, representing continuous quantities using spikes, and performing
reinforcement learning. As such, we suggest that predictive coding should be under-
stood not as a computational goal in and of itself, but as an algorithmic motif (i.e. at
the second of Marr’s three levels [14]): a common pattern that can emerge in neural
circuits subserving fundamentally different computations.
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Even the computational goals for which predictive coding seems a natural fit are not
always best served by it – and indeed, the brain often seems to use other strategies
to achieve these goals. For instance, in retinal ganglion cells, predictive coding is the
optimal strategy for transmitting information by reducing redundancy when light levels
are high. However, when light levels are reduced and so the signal-to-noise ratio in the
input is lower, the optimal strategy is the opposite: to sum the centre and surround [49].
This occurs because computing the prediction error by subtracting two noisy signals
(from the centre and surround) increases the noise in the output signal. At high light
levels, the effect of this increased noise is outweighed by the benefits of redundancy
reduction given by predictive coding, while at low light levels it is more important to
preserve whatever signal is there, and it is therefore detrimental to use a predictive
coding strategy. Indeed, in low-light the retinal surround becomes facilitating, the
opposite of a predictive coding strategy [50]. Similarly, the computational goal of
reinforcement learning can be achieved by several algorithms that do not compute and
represent prediction errors per se [51, 52], and whether prediction error-based or these
other algorithms should be used depends on environmental and neural constraints [53].
Bayesian inference without predictive coding
Just as other computational goals, Bayesian inference can also be performed by many
other neural algorithms and representations which do not use predictive coding (Fig. 1B-
D). Perhaps the most obvious neural representation for probabilities is simply to use
neural firing rates themselves, such that the firing rate of each neuron represents the
posterior probability of one possible value (or a range of values) of the latent variables,
which can be computed following Bayes’ rule (Eq. 2) by multiplying bottom-up inputs,
representing the likelihood, with top-down biases, representing the prior (Fig. 1B) [19].
As multiplication is often thought to be an operation that is harder for neurons to im-
plement than summation, it is preferable to work with a tightly related code in which
firing rates represent log-probabilities [19] (Fig 1C). The best known example of such a
log-probability representation is probabilistic population codes [54]. Both probability
and log-probability codes are special cases of neural responses representing the param-
eters of the posterior probability distribution [18]. There are several other variants of
such parametric representations (e.g. [55]), leading to different algebraic forms of inte-
grating inputs with predictions, but they do not generally lend themselves to predictive
coding.
An alternative approach is to use “direct variable coding”, whereby neural activity
directly represents latent variables. For instance, in sparse coding models of visual im-
ages (or image patches), the latent variables typically correspond to the intensity with
which a visual feature (such as an oriented Gabor filter) is present in the image [56].
Thus, in a direct variable coding representation, neural responses directly encode these
intensities: no response implies the feature represented by the neuron is absent, a small
or a large response means the feature’s intensity is low or high, respectively. (Note that
predictive coding schemes also use a one-to-one correspondence between latent vari-
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ables and neurons, but they define neural responses as representing differences between
inferred and predicted variable values [20], rather than the inferred values directly.)
Neural responses in direct variable encoding schemes either deterministically converge
to the single best setting of the latent variables [56], or stochastically sample multiple
different plausible settings for the latents [18, 57, 58, 59] (Fig. 1D). Interestingly, a
prediction error-like signal was first used for Bayesian inference in the context of such
direct variable coding models. There, it was computed as part of the input to individual
neurons and used to change their output iteratively so that they represented progres-
sively better explanations of the current input [56]. Thus, merely computing prediction
errors does not imply that there must be cells whose responses directly represent these
prediction errors: in fact, self-consistent neural circuit dynamics can be constructed
using pure direct variable coding [56]. In contrast, Bayesian predictive coding models
rarely use purely prediction error-based representations, instead they typically use a
hybrid scheme combining a population of direct coding neurons (which facilitate the
computation of predictions), with an additional population of predictive coding neurons
[20].
Pure direct coding models have enjoyed great success at a number of challenging super-
vised and unsupervised learning tasks, and their dynamics typically take a biologically
plausible form, requiring neurons to integrate their inputs linearly and apply a spiking
nonlinearity [60] or (a possibly stochastic) threshold [61, 62]. In line with the intuition
that priors bias percepts towards expectations based on previous experience [63, 64],
the resulting population activities exhibit an integration of top-down (conveying pri-
ors) and bottom-up inputs (conveying stimulus-related information) that often takes the
form of a simple weighted average of the a priori expected value and that suggested by
sensory evidence (Fig. 1D). The integration of different (independent) sensory sources
of evidence can similarly result in a simple weighted averaging of inputs, again as has
been observed at the level of perception [16].
Several predictions of direct variable coding models are well matched by experimen-
tal data. First, the weighted averaging of prior expectations and sensory information
in population activity has been observed at the level of BOLD signals [65]. Second,
the direct coding of sparse latent causes of natural images accounts for the localised
and orientation-tuned receptive fields of V1 simple cells, with extensions of the same
model – all using direct variable coding – also accounting for complex cell receptive
fields [66, 67]. Third, as classical direct coding theories assume that neurons determin-
istically represent the single best setting of latent variables (the one that has the highest
posterior probability), the responses they predict to any particular input are static (at
least asymptotically) and thus cannot account for the ubiquitously observed variability
of neural responses. However, a stochastic extension of these theories, in which the
activity of neurons represents latent variable values that are sampled from the posterior
distribution [18], accounts for task- [59] and stimulus-dependent variability [58] and
for the similarity of evoked and spontaneous activities in V1 [57].
Finally, different combinations of these representations are also possible: for exam-
ple, a generalisation of sampling-based stochastic dynamics with membrane-potential
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based predictive encoding of multiple simultaneous samples has been suggested to im-
prove upon the time-efficiency of simple sampling-based direct variable codes [68].
Revisiting the evidence
Having understood the distinction between predictive coding and Bayesian inference,
and the different features of experimental data they account for, it is useful to revisit
the evidence that is traditionally considered to specifically support their combination.
In particular, we ask whether these data exclude the possibility of Bayesian inference
being implemented by a pure direct variable code.
A staple hallmark of predictive coding is that “interesting” or “surprising” stimuli
evoke higher responses than expected ones [20, 29, 34]. However, some of these ef-
fects could be explained by attention instead, by which neural resources are directed
towards more interesting or surprising stimuli, such that responses towards these stim-
uli are typically higher than towards unattended ones [69, 70]. Note that while attention
and predictive coding may give rise to similar neural responses, they are fundamentally
different in that top-down attention depends on, and can thus be modulated by the task,
whereas prediction errors are part of a Bayesian computation so should not depend
on the task (to the extent that the statistics of sensory inputs remain unchanged across
tasks) [71]. Moreover, visual attention is focused at only one (or a very small num-
ber of) locations at a time [72], whereas prediction errors can be distributed arbitrarily
across the visual field.
It may also be possible to account for these effects in Bayesian models using direct
variable coding, rather than predictive coding, by noting that the same situations that
result in higher prediction errors also typically evoke higher levels of uncertainty in the
latent variables responsible for the predictions. Under a sampling-based direct coding
scheme, this heightened uncertainty translates into higher levels of neural response
variability [18, 58]. Indeed, less naturalistic images (due to the application of a small
aperture, or phase-scrambling) evoke more unreliable responses in V1 [73, 32]. In turn,
when a signal is passed through a non-linearity (in our case this could be the spiking
non-linearity, Fig. 2F, or the BOLD response non-linearity [74]), an increase in the
variance of the original signal will also change the mean of the transformed signal.
Thus, the increased uncertainty due to an unexpected stimulus may also account for
larger mean responses as measured electrophysiologically or in the BOLD signal.
While large transients following stimulus onset are commonly considered to be another
signature of predictive coding [75], they have also been accounted for in a model using
pure direct variable coding [31] (Fig. 2G). This model uses “non-equilibrium” (techni-
cally, “non-normal”) population dynamics that are particularly efficient for implement-
ing sampling-based direct variable codes [76], and have been suggested to capture es-
sential aspects of the dynamics of cortical circuits, due to the interactions between sep-
arate populations of excitatory and inhibitory neurons [77]. Large transient responses
to any sharp transition (including stimulus onset) are a fundamental characteristic of
such non-normal dynamics [78].
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Finally, extra-classical receptive field effects, such as surround suppression, have also
been explained in models using another canonical algorithmic motif: divisive nor-
malization [79]. In divisive normalization, cells compute a ratio between their direct
(bottom-up) inputs and the summed activity of a pool of neurons. (This is different
from divisive predictive coding in that all neurons use a single global divisor, rather
than each neuron’s activity being divided by its own specific prediction.) Divisive
normalization can describe a range of effects, including saturation, cross-orientation
suppression, and surround suppression [79], and it is modulated by attention [80], lo-
comotion [81], and even disease [82]. In the context of Bayesian computations, divisive
normalization implements inference in a powerful statistical model of natural images
[83, 84, 85], which, critically, assumes a direct variable, rather than a predictive code.
Indeed, inference in such a model not only accounts for the extra-classical receptive
field effects commonly characterised by simple laboratory stimuli [84, 58], but also the
degree of surround suppression observed in response to natural images [85].
In summary, while predictive coding is an attractive algorithmic idea that accounts for
a remarkable range of phenomena, the experimental evidence for it seems inconclusive
in the sense that it does not rule out Bayesian inference with a direct variable code,
potentially in combination with a variety of non-probabilistic processes including at-
tention and adaptation.
Conclusions
Our review suggests three major directions for future research. First, we have suggested
that predictive coding, like divisive normalization, can be used to implement many dif-
ferent computations, and thus should be understood as a neural motif: an algorithmic
step that emerges in a variety of different brain areas and computations. While the
study of motifs is well-developed in molecular biology [86], it remains little studied
in neuroscience suggesting a potentially fruitful direction for future research. Second,
we have seen that while the evidence in favour of any particular implementation of
Bayesian inference is inconclusive, these implementations do make different predic-
tions that could be addressed experimentally. Examples include the singular focus of
attention, compared to the potentially broad distribution of prediction errors, and the
fact that predictive and direct coding make opposite predictions about the effect of prior
expectations: with direct coding suggesting that a weighted average of expectations and
sensory data is taken, and predictive coding suggesting they are subtracted. Third, in
order for (pure) predictive coding to remain a viable candidate algorithm for Bayesian
inference in the brain, it will be necessary to show that it can account for the data
that direct variable codes have already successfully explained, such as the stimulus-
dependent variability of cortical responses. Alternatively, if hybrid direct-predictive
coding schemes are pursued, further work will need to identify phenomena that are
specific to predictive coding neurons, and it will be necessary to clarify how the func-
tional division between direct and predictive coding neurons maps on to anatomically
and physiologically defined cell types in the cortex.
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